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Abstrat
We ontinue the analysis of quantum-like desription of markets
and eonomis. The approah has roots in the reently developed
quantum game theory and quantum omputing. The present paper is
devoted to quantum English aution whih are a speial lass of quan-
tum market games. The approah allows to alulate prot intensities
for various possible strategies.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 03.65.Bz
1 Introdution
Reent researh on quantum omputation and quantum information allowed
to extend the sope game theory for the quantum world [1℄-[4℄. We showed
how quantum game theory may be used for desribing nanial market phe-
nomena [5, 6℄. The purpose of this paper is to extent the previous results
to inorporate also quantum version of English autions. Suh a general-
ization is desirable beause autions prevail among market games and we
think that quantum-like approah provide us with more preise models of
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market phenomena than the standard ones based on probability theory. The
quantum-like desription of market phenomena has a remarkable hane of
gaining favourable reeption from the experts. On the other hand only thor-
ough investigation may reveal if eonomis already is in or would ever enter
the domain of quantum theory. Quantum omputation is on the verge of
being reognized as an autonomous sienti disipline and eorts to unify
soial and physial phenomena should not ause astonishment [7℄. It might
be that while observing the due eremonial of everyday market transation
we are in fat observing apital ows resulting from quantum games elud-
ing lassial desription. " If human deisions an be traed to mirosopi
quantum events one would expet that nature would have taken advantage
of quantum omputation in evolving omplex brains. In that sense one ould
indeed say that quantum omputers are playing their market games aord-
ing to quantum rules" [8℄ .
In the following setions we onsider quantum English autions and ana-
lyze possible prots gained under various onditions. Vikrey's autions and
various generalizations would be presented in following papers.
2 Quantum bargaining with one-side bidding
Let us onsider a partiular ase of quantum bargaining (q-bargaining) [5, 6℄
in whih the rst player, denoted by -1 for future onveniene, sells a denite
amount of some good and the seond one, denoted by 1 want to buy the
good in question. The player 1 proposes a prie and the player -1 aept or
rejet the proposal. Their polarizations [6℄ are |〉 and |〉, respetively so
the q-bargaining has the polarization |〉
-|〉. The transation in question
is aomplished if the obvious rationality ondition is fullled
[q+ p ≤ 0], (1)
where the onvenient Iverson notation [9℄ is used ([expression] denotes the
logial value (1 or 0) of the sentene expression) and the parameters p = ln c
-1
and −q = ln c1 are random variables orresponding to pries at whih the
respetive players withdraw, the withdrawal pries. The random variables
p and q desribe additively prots resulting from prie variations. Their
probability densities are equal to squared absolute values of the appropriate
wave funtions 〈p|ψ〉
-1 and 〈q|ψ〉1 (that is their strategies). Note that the
disussed q-bargaining may result from a situation where several players have
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intention of buying but they were outbid by the player 1 (his withdrawal
prie c1 was greater than the other players ones, c1 > ck, k = 2, . . . , N).
This means that all part in the aution are fermions and they are subjeted
to the Pauli exlusion priniple aording to whih two players annot oupy
the same state. The fermioni harater of q-bargaining parts rst noted in
[5℄ in a slightly dierent ontext. If at the outset of the aution there are
several bidding players then the rationality ondition takes the form
[qmin + p ≤ 0] (2)
where qmin := min
k=1,... ,N
{qk} is the logarithm of the highest bid multiplied by
-1. The probability density of making the transation with the k-th buyers
at the prie ck = e
−qk
is aording to Ref. [5℄ given by
dqk
|〈qk|ψk〉|2
〈ψk|ψk〉
N∏
m=1
m6=k
∫ ∞
−∞
dqm
|〈qm|ψm〉|2
〈ψm|ψm〉
∫ ∞
−∞
dp
|〈p|ψ
-1〉|2
〈ψ
-1|ψ-1〉 [ qk = minn=1,... ,N{qn} ] [qk + p ≤ 0].
(3)
The seller is not interested in making the deal with any partiular buyer and
the unonditional probability of aomplishing the transation at the prie
c is given by the sum over k = 1, . . . , N of the above formula with qk =
− ln c. If we neglet the problem of determining the probability amplitudes
in (3) we easily note that the disussed q-bargaining is in fat the English
aution (rst prie aution) so popular on markets of rare goods. From the
quantum ontext it is interesting to note that the formula (3) ontains wave
funtions of payers who were outbid before the end of the bargaining (f
the Pauli exlusion priniple). The probability density of "measuring" of a
onrete value q of the random variable q haraterizing the player, aording
to the probabilisti interpretation of quantum theory, is equal to the squared
absolute value of the normalized wave funtion desribing his strategy
|〈q|ψk〉|2
〈ψk|ψk〉 dq . (4)
Physiists normalize wave funtions beause onservation laws require that.
Therefore the trivial statement that if a market player may be persuaded into
making a deal or not is a matter of prie alone, orresponds to the physial
fat that a partile annot vanish without any trae.
3 Quantum English aution with a dominating
bidder
The most frequent senario of an English aution is the one with publi
reserve prie (bids lower than the reserve prie are rejeted). The quantum
version of suh an ation may dened as the aution when measures are ut
from one side and the player -1 does not x his withdrawal prie (|〈q|ψ
-1〉|2 =
δ(q− q′)). We annot identify withdrawal and the reserve pries in quantum
approah beause this would result in ontradition beause it would entangle
the reserve prie with the players -1' polarization whih forbiden by the Pauli
exlusion priniple (both players would wind up in the same polarization state
before settlement of the bargain).
We restrit our analysis to quantum English autions during whih the player
-1 has xed withdrawal prie c = ep
′
. The orresponding probability measure
is equal to |〈p|ψ
-1〉|2dp = δ(p− p′)dp. We will also suppose that players are
allowed to use mixed strategies. In that ase the squared absolute values
of probability amplitudes |〈qk|ψ〉|2 in (3) should be replaed by appropriate
onvex linear ombination η(qk).
If for some k=k′ the formula (3) might by replaed by the measure
[qk′+ p
′ ≤ 0] η(qk′) dqk′ (5)
then the aution in question redues the merhandising mathematiian model
[5, 6℄ that is to q-bargaining with the polarization |〉
-|〉 and the player
-1 strategy being a proper state of the operator of supply P or operator of
demand Q if she is selling or buying, respetively. This may happen if the
measure of the set of events for whih qk′ 6=minn=1,... ,N{qn} is negligible eg
k′-th player oers are to high for the rest of partiipants.
4 Quantum English aution with idential strate-
gies of bidders
Let us now onsider the lass of English autions with all N buyers having
the same density of distribution of the logarithm of the withdrawal prie,
η(q), whih may be interpreted as the strategy of a equilibrium market with
the mean value of the withdrawal prie equal to zero (one may always nd
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appropriate urreny units). The formula (3) redues to
[q + p′ ≤ 0] η(q)
(∫ ∞
q
η(r) dr
)N−1
dq (6)
beause the probability of suess in the aution with prie belonging to
[e−q, e−q(1 + dq)] does not depend on the player. The random variable −q
represents the prots measured by the ompound rate of return ahieved by
the player -1 in the aution with respet to the average market prie of the
good being sold. To measure the prots of the seller is suient to notie
that her situation is idential to q-bargaining with xed polarization. Her
abstrat opponent being the Rest of the World [5℄ might aomplish the
bargaining by bidding prie whose logarithm with reversed sing is a random
variable q′ with the distribution equal to N times the distribution (6) that
is the funtion q′ := min{q1, . . . , qN} (1th-order statistis [10℄). The prot
intensity of the seller takes the form [11℄
ρN (p
′) :=
E(−[q′ + p′ ≤ 0] q′)
E(t)
=
−
−p′∫
−∞
q η(q)
(∞∫
q
η(r) dr
)N−1
dq
N−1 +
−p′∫
−∞
η(q)
(∞∫
q
η(r) dr
)N−1
dq
(7)
where t is the random variable desribing time needed by the player -1 an
average prot E(−[q′ + p′ ≤ 0] q′) (with a xed withdrawal prie p′). Let
us reall that (7) has a remarkable property of attaining it maximal value
at a xed point, that, if q has normal distribution, is a ontration almost
everywhere. Normal distributions play a speial role in quantum market
games models beause they exhaust the lass of positive denite pure strate-
gies [5, 6℄. They desribe also equilibrium markets. Therefore til the end of
next paragrph we will suppose that η(q) is a normal distribution. If ρN (p
′)
is a ontration then the opponent of bidders may use a natural method of
maximization of her prot intensity. The method onsists in repeated orre-
tions of the withdrawal prie up to the value equal to mean prot intensity
[5, 6, 11℄. The knowledge of the harater of the distribution η(q) is not ne-
essary. But if the number of bidders is big the same result may be ahieved
by setting the withdrawal prie to zero (p′=−∞). Fig. 1 presents the fall in
values of the funtion ρN (p
′) from maximum to ρN (−∞).
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Figure 1: Plot of prot intensity ρN(p
′) in English q-aution for N=3
N maxp′ ρN(p
′) ρN (−∞) maxp′ ρN (p′)/ρN(−∞)
1 0.27603 0 
2 0.410091 0.282095 1.45373
3 0.498606 0.423142 1.17834
4 0.564273 0.514688 1.09634
5 0.616195 0.581482 1.0597
6 0.658949 0.633603 1.04
7 0.695165 0.676089 1.02822
8 0.726489 0.7118 1.02064
9 0.754024 0.742507 1.01551
10 0.77854 0.769376 1.01191
Table 1: Prot intensities in units of σ) Gaussian 1th-order statistis
The N-dependene beome negligible for large values of N . Tab. 1 presents
results gained while using two methods of seletion the strategy of xing
withdrawal pries by player -1 and N ≤ 10. The last olumn of Tab. 1
ontains ratios that do not depend on the dispersion σ of η(q). It is obvious
that the attrativeness of aution onsists in not in abilities of the seller but
the rivalry among great number of bidders. The opportunities resulting from
growing number of bidders present Fig. 2.
It is easy to notie that for N ≤ 100 a very good approximation of the
prots ounted in units σ is given by a logarithmi series if the assumption
of equality of Gaussian distributions η(qk) is valid. The player -1' prots
6
25 50 75 100
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.1
1.2
Figure 2: Maximal values of prot intensities in English q-aution forN≤100
against the urve 0.21 logN + 0.3
measured with respet to the mean value of the logarithm of market prie of
the good being sold must be balaned by the loss winning bidder (modulo the
possible brokerage that we neglet). It follows that in ase the player -1 does
not x her withdrawal prie the intensity of average losses of bidders is equal
to−2ρN (−∞)
1+N
. Therefore the inrease in the number of bidders is advantageous
to both sides. It is not possible to redue the number of players by forming
linear ombinations. Suh a harateristis being a diret onsequene of the
quantum no-delete theorem [12℄ forbids manipulations on the quantum level
and stabilizes the equilibrium gained by pure strategies of bidders ating as
anonymous Rest of the World [6℄.
5 Prot intensities asymptoti behaviour
The present day growing popularity of internet autions and almost unlim-
ited aess to suh aution organized by robots raises the of maximal prot
intensity in English q-aution with large (N ≫ 100) number of bidders. In
this ase the approximation by the funtion 0.21 logN+0.3 is no longer valid.
But fortunately it is possible to nd the asymptoti behaviour of the funtion
maxp′{ρN (p′)}. To this end it is suient to nd the asymptoti behaviour
of the random variable
aNq
′ + bN , (8)
7
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
0.5
0.75
1.25
1.5
1.75
2
Figure 3: Plots of futions
√
lnN
2
+ 2γ−ln 4pi−ln lnN
4
√
2 lnN
and 0.21 logN+0.3 (dashed
line)
where the series aN and bN are given by
aN :=
√
2 lnN and bN :=
1
2
(ln 4pi + ln lnN)− 2 lnN.
If η(q) is the standard normal distribution then the umulative distribution
funtion of the random variable (8) being the resaled logarithm of the prie
striking the bargain tends to the Gumbel umulative distribution funtion
(double exponential) [13℄ [?℄
P
(
anq
′ + bn ≤ x
)
N→∞−−−→ e−e−x .
The expetation value of a random variable with probability density e
−e−x−xdx
is equal to the Euler onstant γ := limN→∞
∑N
k=1
1
k
− lnN ≃ 0.5772. This
after same elementary algebra leads to the asymptoti behaviour of the prot
intensity maxp′{ρN (p′)} for N→∞ of the form
√
lnN
2
+
2γ − ln 4pi − ln lnN
4
√
2 lnN
.
The dierene between the above funtion and the previous logarithmi ap-
proximation is plotted in Fig. 3.
Details may be found in Cramér's book [10℄.
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6 Bidder's prots
Let us onsider in detail the ase when the player -1 xes a unique withdrawal
prie, the players numbered by k = 1, . . . , k′−1, k′+1, . . . , N use the same
strategies implying Gaussian distribution, but the player k′ unlike uses the
strategy with xed withdrawal prie e−q
′
given by the Dira measure δ(qk′ −
q′)dqk′. Reall [5, 6℄ that, in the quantum approah, the logarithm of a
ontingent reselling prie of the good in question is indenite so that E(pk′) =
0. Therefore the k′-th player prot intensity is given by
ρk′(q
′) =
[q′+p′ ≤ 0] q′
1 +
(∞∫
q′
η(q) dq
)1−N (9)
Fig. 4 presents the shape of the prot intensity funtion for the three lowest
values of N when p′→−∞ and η(q) is the standard normal distribution.
-0.5 1 2 3
0.05
0.1
N=4
N=3
N=2
Figure 4: The plot of the bidder's prot intensity as a funtion of determin-
isti withdrawal prie
For N=1 we reover the standard q-bargaining of Ref. [6℄ and plot we be the
strait line given by the equation ρk′(q
′) = 1
2
q′. Even if there is only a few ative
bidders the k′-th player has very limited opportunities of mak ing prots. But
if she insists on buying the good she will try to guess suh a withdrawal prie
e
p′
to be able to bid the possible highest prie q′ that would not exeed
−p′. It is worth to note here that the quantum theory allows to multiply
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positive prots of a bidder that may be meagre in a single aution. The Pauli
exlusion priniple does not forbid winning in several autions if only the
players strategy defeated the rivals (it might not result in buying: the sellers
withdrawal prie might be to high). Immediate teleportation of the state
(strategy) [14℄ makes suh quantum market tehnis possible and eetive.
The onsequenes of the fat that strategies annot be multiplied (undividity
of attention) [5℄ resulting from the no-loning theorem [15℄ are not explained
by lassial models. The possibility of eetive using the same strategy at
dierent sites allows to make the prots arbitrary large. This paradox present
in lassial approahes should inline to researh into quantum market games.
The no-loning theorem may also explain our ignorane of our and opponents
strategy states: the knowledge would mean loning.
7 Conditional probabilities in quantum English
autions
The results presented in the previous there paragraphs have to be modied if
we suppose that the players joining an aution in the irumstanes where the
bidders know the pries e
pk
at whih they may resell the bought good and the
prie e
−q
-1
seller paid the good (or the value it presents to him). Adherents
of utility theory may that the parameters q
-1, p1, . . . , pN orresponds to the
utilities of autioned good haraterizing the appropriate players. So all
partiipants know the value (that may depend on the player) of the good
being autioned. In this ase we should substitute the appropriate Wigner
funtions [5, 6℄ for the squared absolute values of amplitudes in (3):
|〈p|ψ
-1〉|2 −→W-1(p-1, q-1)
|〈q|ψk〉|2 −→Wk(pk, qk).
(10)
So if we take into onsideration mixed strategies of partiipants ηk(pk, qk)
(that is onvex linear ombinations of Wigner funtions) we get
dqk ηk(pk, qk)
N∏
m=1
m6=k
∫ ∞
−∞
dqm ηm(pm, qm)
∫ ∞
−∞
dp
-1 η-1(p-1, q-1) [ qk = min
n=1,... ,N
{qn} ] [qk + p-1 ≤ 0]
(11)
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instead of the measure (3). The umulative distribution funtions
∫ p
−∞
ηk(pk, qk=onstans) dpk and
∫ q
−∞
ηk(pk=onstans, qk) dqk
have the natural interpretation of demand and supply urves of the k-th
player (if plotted for the ommon domain ln c = p = −q) [5, 6, 8℄. The
former analysis of prot intensities is now valid only if p1= . . .=pN (exept
for pk′) and if all strategies are not giens (the positiveness of probability
measure is supposes in prove of the theorem on maximum of prot intensity).
The fasinating lass of English q-autions with gien strategies requires a
separate analysis.
8 Towards a omplete theory of quantum au-
tion
The analysis of English q-aution with reversed roles that is bidders are
selling is analogous. More interesting is the ase when the polarization of
the q-aution is hanged to |〉
-|〉. In this ase the player -1 reveals her
withdrawal prie and the player 2 aepts it (and those of the rest of the
players) or not. Suh an aution is known as the Vikrey's aution (or the
seond prie aution). The winner is obliged to pay the seond in dereasing
order prie from all the bids (and the withdrawal prie of the player -1).
In the quantum approah English and Vikrey's autions are only speial
ases of a phenomenon alled q-aution. In the general ase both squared
absolute values of the amplitudes |〈
-|-〉|2 and |〈-|-〉|2 are non-
vanishing so we have onsider them with weights orresponding to these
probabilities. Suh a general q-aution has yet no math on the existing
markets. It should be very interesting to analyse the motivation properties
of q-autions eg nding out when the best strategy is the one orresponding
to the player's value of the good. The quantum ontext of the very popular
(f the 1996 Nobel prie justiation) Vikrey's aution will be analysed in
a separate paper.
If we onsider only positive denite probability measures then bidder gets the
highest prots in Vikrey's aution using strategies with publi admission
of his valuation of the autioned good. But it might not be so for gien
strategies beause positiveness of measures is supposed in proving inentive
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harater of Vikrey's autions [16℄. The presene of giens on real markets
might not be so abstrat as it seems to be. Captain Robert Gien who is
supposed to nd additive measure not being positive denite but present
on existing real market in the forties of the XIX entury [17℄ probably got
ahead of physiists in observing quantum phenomena. Suh departures from
the demand low if orretly interpreted do not ause any problem neither
for adepts nor for beginners. Employers have probably always thought that
work supply as funtion of payment is sarely monotonous.
The distinguished by their polarization rst and seond prie autions have
analogues in the Knaster solution to the pragmati fair division problem
that is with ompensatory payments for indivisible parts of the property
[18℄. Suh a duality might be found even in eletion systems that as autions
form proedures of solving fair division problems [19℄. It may be that soial
frustrations aused by eletion systems should enourage us to disuss suh
topis.
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